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The Starehe Boys School in Nairobi is one of the undoubted success stories of post-independence Kenya. It was founded in 1959 by Geoffrey Griffin, a disillusioned former British army officer. Appalled by the atrocities committed by both sides during the Mau Mau Emergency (1952-60), Griffin refused to 10 renew his commission and worked instead to care for juveniles caught up in the crisis. Initially with just two tin sheds on a piece of waste ground not far from the slums in the Eastlands district of the city, the school began as a club which took in destitute boys made homeless either through the death of their parents or their 15 forced migration. Griffin conceived of Starehe as a home and an escape for the boys from their often dreadful circumstances (starehe means 'peace' or 'comfort' in Swahili). With support from a range of financial backers, Griffin's plans became more ambitious. After 20 independence at the end of 1963, his 'club' soon became an officially recognized school and by the early 1970s was achieving some of the best examination results in the country at both primary and secondary level. Today, with the boys easily recognised in their familiar red and blue uniforms, often seen 25 parading in their famous brass band, the school is persistently put forward as a triumphant display of what an independent Kenya can and has achieved. Through its myriad supporters and donors all around the world, the school continues to take in the poor and disadvantaged and provides them with a free 30 education alongside a small (up to 20 per cent of the total school population) -if massively over-subscribed -cohort of fee-paying students. For all these individuals, Starehe became a symbol for something much more significant. It stood in for the future of a 25 country, if not a continent. For Griffin it was a means by which he could offer his services to his fellow Kenyans after the Emergency, a means more in keeping with the ill-fated liberal rehabilitative principles that supposedly lay behind the notorious detention camps set up for the Mau Mau. For the moderate nationalists 30 who took control of the country at independence it represented what Kenyatta termed harambee, Kenya's own 'self help' process of national development. For others it constituted a traditional form of charitable assistance, while for others still it was an example of development for all of Africa to follow. Only for Ken African context. Yet for all the others, it was to serve as a classic instance of what has been somewhat pejoratively labelled a 'donor darling', the sheer amount of international funds being the key factor behind its growth and success. 5 This article takes the admittedly peculiar example of just one school to cast light on wider processes in the history of charity, decolonization and development. Starehe became an instance of what has otherwise been referred to as the 'projection of personal ideologies onto a space on the map sufficiently little-known as to 10 accommodate fantasies of every type'.
2 As a consequence, the school has been able to thrive. It has come to have a special place in Kenyan society, its achievements as a 'bastion of excellence' perpetually being reported in the press. 3 Griffin himself was honoured several times by the Kenyan and British 15 governments and frequent official reports have commended the school's disciplinary, educational and social service record. 4 All this was possible because, unlike other aid initiatives, Starehe has been able to attract the consistent support, over several decades, of international charities, official aid agencies, the UK and other 20 western governments and the Kenyan ruling class. Griffin proved to be an adept master at making all of these potentially conflicting interests and agendas serve the purpose of his beloved school.
Thanks to the opening up of new archives, principally the unofficial British agencies of Oxfam, the Save the Children 25 Fund (hereafter SCF) and Christian Aid, which constituted some of Starehe's main international donors, it is possible to 2 Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains: Africa in the World (London, 2011), 94. 3 'Starehe's bastion of excellence', Weekly Review, 13 Oct 1989, 20-1. Further such press cuttings can be found in the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (hereafter KNA), XK/1/12, 'Starehe'. 4 Aug. 2013, at5http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000091464/dr-geoffreygriffin-a-man-who-had-a-heart-for-black-children-in-need?articleID¼2000091464 &story_title¼dr-geoffrey-griffin-a-man-who-had-a-heart-for-black-children-in-nee d&pageNo¼24(accessed 19 Jan. 2015); 'Geoffrey Griffin: obituary', The Times, 18 Aug 2005, at5http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/obituaries/article2084245.ece (accessed 19 Jan. 2015); Report of the National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies (Nairobi, 1976), 35. trace how and why Starehe appealed to so many. Moreover, in situating such sources alongside those produced by the school itself, and with newspapers and official papers available in the UK and Kenya National Archives, it is possible to offer a case 5 study of development that follows a literature on decolonization in approaching the subject from the three-sided perspective of the global context, the national donors of the former colonial powers and the socio-political pressures within the recipient state.
5 The first part of this essay therefore traces the appeal of Starehe to 10 donors in Britain and elsewhere, especially for rapidly expanding charities and NGOs becoming increasingly associated with the global development infrastructure. The second part turns its attention to Kenya itself, drawing out how the appeal of the school to certain political agendas and national priorities 15 complemented the desire of the donor community to provide a model for African development.
In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the history of humanitarianism. In part this is a reaction to our present-day concerns about the ways in which 20 seemingly straightforward feelings for the welfare of distant others is interconnected with wider political issues about human rights, global governance and international security. 6 Humanitarian histories, covering topics as broad as anti-slavery activism, refugee assistance, disaster relief and longer-term aid 25 interventions, uncover patterns of empathy, solidarity and fellow feeling that run counter to the real and imagined boundaries created by global geopolitical rivalries, either of an imperial or Cold War nature. This case study of Starehe makes a contribution to this literature by connecting it with the three 30 key issues of decolonization, development and charity.
First, as a school set up under a late-colonial regime and which flourished under an independent one, Starehe represents a key example of an institution which eased the processes of decolonization by providing important continuities of [25.8.2016-9: Second, these continuities not only mattered for newly empowered Kenyan officials and politicians, but for international agencies keen to utilize the contacts that they had made during imperialism to support further development initiatives. These interpretations of decolonization are easy to 20 reconcile with a literature on development. The late-colonial state engaged in a heightened policy of 'developmentalism' that constituted a 'second colonial occupation' of centralized planning and technological progress. 10 The expert personnel and the faith in rational planning were shared not only among 25 colonial officials and moderate nationalist planners, but also by 7 Griffin included -sought alternative sources of employment.
11
The point that the case of Starehe demonstrates, though, is that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also played an important role in the interconnected histories of decolonization and development. Starehe's formative decade -the 1960s -10 came at the same time as the UN's first development decade when the international aid system was being both reimagined and reinforced. Bodies such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (hereafter FAO) became concerned not only with prestige economic and technical infrastructure projects but also 15 with meeting the needs of the hungriest people. Reaching the poorest meant that the FAO worked in partnership with NGOs on the ground which, in turn, continued to support local welfare and missionary bodies that had operated at the frontline of grassroots social services for many decades previously. 14 It resulted in a scatter-gun approach to small-scale local development projects that both lacked cohesion and facilitated the continuation of 20 colonial institutions and systems of knowledge. Older forms of mission and, as with Griffin, ex-pat civil servants proved particularly adept at securing funds from British charities. As will be seen from a focus on Starehe's two principal early backers, the Save the Children Fund and Oxfam, the turn to 25 development, although well meaning and potentially effective, was also un-coordinated and largely unaccountable. Starehe's story is therefore also one about how aid has worked on the ground, with all the success and failures that this has entailed for NGO involvement in the international aid business. That Starehe is able to bear the weight of such an analysis, is in large part due to the multifaceted career of Griffin himself. He simultaneously held three positions. In the first place, he was a charitable volunteer. Starehe was always his own private initiative, supported by the unpaid work that he put in as director after he had finished his day job and which continued to his death in 2005. In that sense he was a recipient of aid, though one who was able to exploit the opportunities available such that his 5 biographer referred to him as 'Kenya's champion beggar'. 16 Secondly, though, he was also a career civil servant during decolonization and beyond. He served as Colony Youth Officer in the last years of British rule and was then immediately appointed by Kenyatta to run the new National Youth Service.
10
This gave him superb contacts across several administrations and his work there makes clear just how important youth policy was to both the colonial and post-colonial state. Finally, Griffin worked in an honorary capacity as the administrator for SCF in Kenya, thus connecting him to the world of international development.
15
This ensured that he was always able to make Starehe the chief focus of activity for SCF in Kenya, as well as opening a door to various sources of funding that existed more generally across Europe and North America. As will be seen, the real reasons for Starehe's success are due to Griffin's navigation of these three 20 roles -recipient, administrator, donor -which mapped onto the three broader historical processes emphasised belowcharity, decolonization, development -and always to the advantage of the institution closest to his heart. But that he was able to do so points to more significant interconnections between 25 colonial and post-colonial states, donor publics and charities, and the wider structures that supported international development practices in the key early years of decolonization. 19 Certainly, his military service shook him to the extent that he resigned his commission at the first opportunity. 20 And whether through guilt, grievance, empathy or compassion, he clearly left with a genuine desire to provide a different set of opportunities for the next generation of Kenyan youth.
At Starehe Griffin took in often desperately poor boys, many of whom were homeless, orphaned and embarking upon a life of 25 crime. In one early survey of 400 boys admitted to the school, over half had been arrested and referred to Starehe through the juvenile courts. 20 Conditions in the city ensured that Griffin had a steady supply of boys to reform. In 1969 one survey estimated that there were 25,000 boys of primary school age in Nairobi who 30 were not enrolled in school. 21 Shell/BP in Kenya and held a fortuitous meeting with John Francis, its public relations officer. Griffin took Francis around some of the hovels and hideouts where homeless boys could be found in Nairobi, before showing him the rudimentary rehabilitation initiatives that were then in place. Francis was 10 impressed and committed his company to an association with the school that extended beyond the financial: he drew up the school constitution, chaired the Starehe management committee and eased relations with the colonial administration when questions arose about Griffin's potentially conflicting 15 private and public roles.
29 Shell BP provided the original tin huts for the school, made various capital grants over the years and contributed to running costs by an amount which had increased to £6,000 per annum by 1977. 30 Other early local and ex-pat funders included the Sheikh Fazal Noordin Charitable 20 Trust, the Child Welfare Society, the Kenya Welfare Trust, the African Welfare Society, the Roundtable No. 1 and the Welfare Trust of East Africa. In total these organizations and others would donate around £13,000 in the first two years of the school's existence, enabling up to one hundred boys to become 25 boarders. 31 However, it was when Griffin turned to the West that really significant donations started to come in, enabling what was still a boys 'club' to become a school. First, he turned to the UK and secured £3,000 from the Dulverton Trust. The amount itself was 30 not particularly large, but the personal connection was more important. The Trust's chair, Lord Dulverton, also sat on the Council of Oxfam, and would take a special interest in that NGO's Africa Committee, even going so far as to attend its first 28 Mwai Kibaki, 'Speech at burial ceremony of Geoffrey Griffin', at5http://www. oldcambrians.com/Obituary-Griffin,Geoffrey.html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2015).
29 J. G. Francis to James Gichuru, minister for finance, 11 July1963: KNA, A2G1/7/82. 30 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 151; King'ala, Autobiography, 63-5. 31 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 7, 23-5. MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE Field Directors meeting in Nairobi in 1969. 32 Second, Griffin was aware of his own lack of professional expertise in youth work and education and so embarked on a brief trip to Los Angeles and the US to learn about new methods of handling 5 delinquent youth. There he rejected most new developments in psychology and care work, but not before also visiting the offices of the Ford Foundation. This organization committed itself to match the funding that had already been raised and gave Griffin £12,000 in 1961 which enabled him to build a two-storey 10 teaching block which he named after the Foundation.
33
In 1962 Griffin took two Starehe boys, George Waiwa and Peter Njenga, to the UK on a Youth-Helps-Youth Campaign. This was ostensibly to raise funds for the youth centre work which Griffin was employed by the colonial government to oversee, and which 15 aimed to cover the whole of Kenya. Instead he used the trip to promote his private venture. The visit was much reported in the press and Griffin was able to exploit his official position to secure a meeting with Queen Elizabeth, the Lord Mayor of London and Cliff Richard (who would reciprocate by visiting the school the 20 following year, performing his songs for the boys in the school hall). 34 More importantly, Griffin's visit consolidated his connections to the headquarters of the SCF, of which the queen was patron. The charity was to become Starehe's most important backer, funding the school from 1964 through to 25 1996. Rather than financing one-off capital costs, SCF committed to the long term by providing an annual grant of £8,000 to cover running costs such as teachers' salaries. By the 1970s SCF was spending up to £50,000 per year in Kenya, the vast bulk of which found its way to Starehe. 35 responsibilities. In the report that he wrote with his friend Roger Owles, they glossed over much of the government's own actions in displacing hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu and instead attributed the rising number of urban homeless youth to 'the incipient breakdown of tribal responsibility caused by the social 10 changes from subsistence to cash economy in the rural area, and the rapid urban development'. 41 Amidst this 'crisis of youth', a common trope of late-imperialist social welfare, they asked SCF to again fund a Place of Safety in the Kariokor district of Nairobi to take in boys found wandering the streets. SCF duly responded and began also to take an interest in Griffin's private work at nearby Starehe too. Having appointed a new administrator for Kenya in 1961, SCF remained in frequent contact with Griffin. 43 He ensured that SCF maintained its support for the Kariokor Place of Safety while 20 also informing SCF of his more ambitious long-term plans for his other centre which he hoped to 'run more on the lines of a good boarding school' and which he felt was 'much more in keeping with the ideal of SCF'. 44 In 1962 the SCF administrator began to develop plans to establish a network of 'Places of Safety' around 25 the country, working in liaison with the Kenyan government. But at this point Griffin seems to have persuaded SCF along another route, effectively throwing into confusion the boundaries between his own private initiatives, his work as a civil servant and the supposedly independent operations of a British charity. Despite the obvious potential for conflicts of interest, the SCF hierarchy had nothing but praise for his achievements at this time, further believing that his own personal administrative qualities 15 trumped any difficulties arising from the blurring of his different positions. 46 As such, what Griffin had managed to put in place by 1963 was a system of social welfare that not only blurred the boundary between the official and unofficial spheres, but collapsed the distinction between short-term humanitarian 20 relief and long-term development. Griffin's institutions cared for the children from initial 'rescue', to immediate 'safety', to long term 'comfort'. This was significant since NGOs in Britain had to navigate the intricacies and whims of charity legislation and public opinion, both of which could be uncomfortable with 25 aid rather than relief. 47 In addition, many staff within these organizations were likewise uneasy about taking on longer term projects that did not appear to deal with immediate suffering and which seemed to take their organization beyond its original charitable statutes. 48 52 Once the connection was established, Griffin wrote frequently of his duties to meet the needs of his 'dependent' boys and haggled continuously for further funds, be it to support additional teachers or to fund capital projects. Outstripping these donations, however, were those from Oxfam. SCF first approached Oxfam in 1963 to see if the latter would assist its work at the school. Oxfam was impressed and duly gave £11,000 to build and equip a classroom. This was followed by a further substantial grant of £15,300 to construct a two-storey 15 workshop block and dormitory in 1965, the latter named after H. Leslie Kirkley, the then director of Oxfam. In total, Oxfam gave the school around £43,000 over a decade. 54 Its assistance was crucial to enabling Starehe to be granted a registration certificate, thereby making it possible for boys to sit the 20 national preliminary examinations. The charity was in no doubt that it was money well spent. As its Overseas Aid Director put it in 1968, 'Something of a miracle has been worked in the lives of many of the children'.
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Within just a few years from its establishment, Starehe had 25 captured the imagination of many around the world and a steady stream of visitors had passed through its doors. While visits by royalty and politicians such as Senator Robert Kennedy and Indira Gandhi were crucial to Griffin 
The only apparent blip in this constant stream of praise came in 1969. To mark its fiftieth anniversary, SCF commissioned the left-wing British social realist film-maker Ken Loach to make a 15 film of its work. He travelled to Kenya and focused on Starehe, arguing against the transfer of English public school customs to the local African context as well as engaging in a broad-ranging critique of neo-colonialism in which he implicated 'sticking plaster' charities such as SCF. As a piece of propaganda, the 20 film was an unmitigated 'disaster', and SCF aggressively pursued Loach to ensure an extensive cover-up that resulted in the film being effectively banned (it was not aired in public until 2011). . 58 Haslemere Committee, The Haslemere Declaration (London, 1968) .
[ Griffin and the SCF were keen to make another film about Starehe rather different in tone from that of Loach's. 60 Anne's interest increased SCF's resolve to make the school the focus of much of its activity in Africa and it renewed its efforts to convince other donors of the Starehe cause. 61 The British High 63 It proved to be a huge success for both Starehe and the SCF. 64 It was followed by a special Blue Peter publication and a Christmas Appeal later in the year, as well as a follow-up film in 1972 and a presentation on Starehe by Shaw's position at Starehe helps us to understand the importance of the school within Kenyan society and politics. Shaw first met Griffin on the latter's fundraising trip to the UK in 1962 when Shaw himself was on leave from his then job with 20 the Agricultural Department. He returned to become a volunteer at Starehe, and soon afterwards his salary was being directly funded by SCF. Indeed, it was this daytime employment which enabled Shaw to work for the Kenyan police as a volunteer. Like Griffin, Shaw served more than one master, though it was Starehe 25 that commanded his ultimate loyalty (he forfeited part of his salary as a donation to the school). But it is the respect and support that both men courted and captured from Kenya's elites that explains another side to Starehe's success.
While the school's financial stability relied on the philanthropic But it is the particular ethos of the school that warrants further explanation. That Shaw's brutal exploits with the night-time criminals of Nairobi could become well known, not only to Starehe's financial backers and the Kenyan public but also the school's pupils, is significant. Shaw exercised a firm hand over the 25 capital's discordant elements that fitted in with an 'ideology of order' that has been argued to have been the chief characteristic of post-independence Kenyan politics and which has overshadowed other political liberties and civil rights. 72 This in turn coalesced with the particular focus on discipline that Griffin exercised C. Carothers that Mau Mau rebels could be 'cured' though reeducation and rehabilitation. This provided a rationale for the British government's development of detention centres as these were to be the sites for an intensive hearts and minds operation.
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As Caroline Elkins has put it, this was a 'curious moment for 15 liberal reform' though one which would come to be almost wholly overshadowed by the forms of torture and brutality that became the norm of the camps, particularly as practised by Special Branch (the police unit that Shaw himself joined).
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Nevertheless, Askwith maintained his position despite the 20 overwhelming defiance of his principles at the Mau Mau detention camps and was able to carve a tiny niche for his slightly more enlightened approach.
75
Shortly after leaving the army Griffin and his friend Roger Owles took up posts in 1955 as community development 25 officers in Askwith's new ministry. They were employed at Manyani Detention Camp to identify underage boys who were being held inappropriately, with adults and more seasoned Mau Mau rebels. 76 Viewed with suspicion by both the inmates and Special Branch, Griffin nevertheless identified around 1,000 30 children of sixteen years or less. On these he was then able to practise a more liberal form of rehabilitation at Wamumu Approved School and Youth Camp in 1955. Unlike all other forms of detention and supposed 'rehabilitation' during the Emergency, Wamumu has been described as 'a paradise for 73 Along with Owles and his superior officer, Captain George Gardener, Griffin embarked on a hearts and minds operation 5 that drew extensively from his limited experience, made up as it was of his own schooling and officer training. He reduced the armed personnel at the camp from 200 to 40, obtained a blanket pardon for the boys from the attorney-general and set to work to win their trust, turning them away from the ideology of Mau Mau 10 and towards becoming useful colonial citizens. In practice this meant strong discipline but also the creation of educational classes, skills training, physical exercise and competitive sports. The boys built their own classrooms, recreational grounds and a church. Following Gardener's lead, Griffin introduced 15 rudimentary khaki uniforms, Reveille, flag parades on Empire Day, a house system (four out of five of which were named after colonial Kenyan 'pioneers': Boyes, Delamere, Grogan and Lugard), prefects (adapted to the local context in that the role was only available to the circumcised, which had the effect of 20 clearly demarcating an internal hierarchy) and a Boy Scouts troop (Griffin himself had been Kenya's first ever King's Scout and would become, along with Shaw, a member of the Kenya Scout Council). 78 Almost all of this prefigured many of his initiatives at Starehe. He even introduced a motto, 'Truth and 25 Loyalty', that might well have been used for his later school. And the famous Starehe school council, baraza, was borrowed directly from Wamumu where it was used as an informal public meeting where boys could relate their past experiences to the group and 'cleanse' themselves of Mau Mau. 82 In 1959 Griffin persuaded both former detainees to join him at 20 Starehe. Gikubu was placed in charge of the Kariokor Rescue Centre and Geturo became principal of the school itself. Owles himself later joined Griffin as an officer in the National Youth Service and regularly volunteered to help with the school band. 83 Together they implemented a regime that drew directly from 25 their experience of Wamumu. Not only was the institutional language of 'Places of Safety', 'reception centres' and 'youth clubs' (for many years Starehe retained its nomenclature as a club rather than a school) directly taken from the rehabilitative educational philosophy has been the trust that he has claimed to have placed in the boys. But such trust, he clearly believed, could only survive within a highly ordered environment. Discipline was therefore crucial to how the school functioned. This is not to go so far as to argue that discipline overshadowed 15 trust in the same manner as discipline and brutality overshadowed rehabilitation in the Mau Mau camps. But it is to argue that the Emergency provided a stimulus to discipline that Griffin's experience in the army reinforced. In the latecolonial and early post-colonial periods, Griffin clearly believed 20 that tough discipline was a necessary backbone to everything else that went on at the school. He took personal responsibility for all disciplinary matters, possibly as a deliberate counterpoint to the perceived arbitrariness of white colonial justice. Teachers were not permitted to execute their own punishments and all 25 offending boys were instead referred to him. In the early days of the school, he clearly believed in the importance of being 'tough' with boys who had been brought up on the streets. He was not against prefects 'knocking [a boy] cold' before presenting him for further, more structured punishment. One of the most contrived 30 was a system known as 'D' which he took directly from Wamumu. 85 Here, the offender would be kept separate from the other boys, interviewed daily by Geturo or Gikubo and set to manual work. 86 Even his extraordinarily sympathetic biographer tells remarkable stories of how quick Griffin was to 84 Ocobock, An Uncertain Age, ch. 85 Ocobock, An Uncertain Age, ch. 7. 86 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 33.
use corporal punishment: 'He could cane a whole class of 35 boys and have the strength to shout, ''Next!'' after caning the 35 th '. 87 Discipline was not simply about punishment. It also meant the rigorous structuring of all the boys' time. But particularly in the 5 1960s the line between discipline and punishment was narrowly drawn. The boys used to refer to Griffin as Gatemi, a Kikuyu diminution of the word 'cut', which denoted his supposed effectiveness with the cane. 88 Certainly this gave rise to rumours about his background. The boys gossiped that he had 10 been a ruthless hunter of Kikuyu during Mau Mau when he had supposedly similarly been nicknamed 'the knife'. 89 Ken Loach picked up on the boys' stories when making the SCF film and repeated the rumour that the school was run by a headmaster who had 'shot more people in the Mau Mau uprising than anyone 15 else'. 90 Beyond the more fanciful stories, though, there were certainly concerns about the regulations, order and military discipline imposed at the school. That relatively few Old Starehians from the early 1960s attend alumni events might well be due to their less appreciated experiences of the school. 20 Certainly, there were criticisms at the time of 'Griffin's magic mix of uniform, rules and cane' which created what amounted to a 'military establishment' and visiting NGO staff could be taken aback at the militarism of the school and Griffin's own khaki attire. 91 
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In later years Griffin became more comfortable about sparing the rod. He maintained, however, that corporal punishment was absolutely crucial to order more generally. When unrest broke out across Kenya's schools in 2001, he regretted the banning of caning in schools which he felt underlay the disturbances. 92 In this sense, his approach echoed the 'festishization of order' and stability articulated by Kenya's political leaders and which was used to discredit the opponents of the state's development policies and 'to violate its citizens' human 5 rights'. 93 This explains why Griffin and Starehe have been presented as models of good educational practice in Kenya and why Shaw's dual role at the school and with the police was seen as complementary. The Ministry of Education has been a persistent admirer of Starehe's disciplinary techniques and record and it 10 frequently asked Griffin to reflect on his experiences to fellow headmasters and educationalists. 94 When, in 1982, civil disturbances erupted throughout the capital, Starehe was admired for its ability to prevent the protests spilling onto its campus, an achievement many other schools could not claim. 95 
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Following the notorious rape of seventy-one schoolgirls by the their fellow boarders at St Kizito's school in 1991, as well as other outbreaks of general indiscipline, Griffin was asked to submit a full report to a specially commissioned presidential committee on student unrest. 96 So well received were his 20 recommendations that Griffin went on to revise them into a general set of guidelines on good practice that were published in 1994 as School Mastery.
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But if Griffin's approach to education was aligned with the requirements of the new post-colonial state, then so too did his 25 work at Starehe fit with the specifically Kenyan approach to nation-building advocated by the moderate nationalists who supported Kenyatta after 1963. 'Harambee', literally 'all pull together' in Swahili, became the official motto of Kenya. It was a phrase ideally suited to the new leaders of Kenya who eschewed 30 the more redistributive elements of socialism as advocated in other parts of Africa and who looked instead to self-supporting institutions that did not upset an otherwise pro-capitalist and prowestern agenda. Starehe fitted well within this conceptual framework, suggesting both a tradition of self-help that had 5 marked the independent school movement in Kenya and a means of securing western funds for social welfare programmes that the new regime could ill afford. In effect harambee eased the transition from colonialism to independence and enabled institutions and individuals such as Starehe and Griffin to offer 10 almost seamless continuities between the two.
This was a marriage of school and nationalist politics that had to be navigated carefully. Griffin undoubtedly came under some pressure after 1963 from those more radical voices that pushed for the 'Africanization' of key positions in the new independent state. 15 Griffin ran into trouble with Dick Oloo, the MP who also served as the director of the National Council of Social Service and who was well aware of the many worthy welfare services that would welcome the injection of foreign capital that Griffin was able to obtain for Starehe.
98 But Griffin had the backing of Kenyatta who 20 immediately made him the director of the National Youth Scheme (hereafter NYS) in April 1964. The NYS was created as an 'army without guns', a mechanism to channel Mau Mau agression to more productive purposes and to instil discipline and order into all of the nation's youth for civilian purposes, as well as 25 providing a release valve for any pent-up feelings of dissatisfaction among former Mau Mau fighters. 99 For Griffin, it gave him regular access to Kenyatta, a crucial opportunity for face-toface interaction given the way in which the president conducted politics and which resulted in the reward of an extra one month's 30 leave per year from his official post to allow Griffin to focus on Starehe. 100 ). But the key point is that at all times and in all his roles he was attuned to different political and institutional agendas and was able to ensure that Starehe took full advantage of them.
The actual benefits that Starehe could derive from the blurring 5 of Griffin's private and public functions within Kenya might be trivial in any one instance. Cumulatively, however, they could be much more substantial. As with his role in the colonial government, he could steer dignitaries along a course that would be sure to pass Starehe. 109 He carefully selected 10 government officials to serve on his management committee. 110 He might obtain, through Shaw, additional assistance from the police in training the school band. 111 Or he might use his connections with other government departments to secure better school trips for his boys. 112 The United Nations Day
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Parade in 1966, which Griffin organised, offered a visual image of the fuzziness that he deliberately fostered. The Starehe boys marched alongside the scouts and the NYS conscripts, while the school band played with the police. 113 Inevitably, the dual roles that he adopted began to attract their critics. Along with pressures 20 for Africanization from MPs such as Oprong Oduya, questions arose in parliament about whether Griffin was supporting his school through the admission of children of the rich and powerful. 114 Always a lurking suspicion among the school's critics and those given to jealousy following their own failure to 25 secure places for their sons, there has never been enough evidence to make such accusations stick, not least because of Griffin's genuine commitment to helping the disadvantaged. 115 But he was politically savvy enough to know just when it was important to please his masters. Two alumni from the early decades particularly stand out: Michael and Andrew Kenyatta, respectively the grandson and nephew of the president.
5
The school clearly meant different things to different people, though for all its boys stood in for the future of Kenya as a whole. As much as Starehe became the beacon of hope for so many western aid agencies, it also became a symbol of a model for the development espoused by Kenyatta and his allies. Moboya, Kibaki, Moi and Itote would be joined as visitors to the school by a whole host of prominent government officials. For instance, Mbiyu Koinange, Kenyatta's brother-in-law, minister of state and son of the prominent Kikuyu chief, Koinange Wa Mbiyu, even presented the boys with a live bull as a Christmas present 15 following his visit. 117 Starehe took in boys from other African countries in an attempt to present the school as a symbol of progress not just for a nation but for an entire continent. 118 The people that the school did not attract were those associated with the opposition leader Oginga Odinga, a former minister in Kenyatta quo' of the colonial regime and had merely enriched itself to take the place of the old settler elite. 119 Later, in a voice-over by either Thiong'o or Kantai to a scene of the Starehe boys marching in their band, the viewer is informed that 'the Starehe system, the elimination of Swahili on campus, the prohibition of African 30 What is remarkable, though, are the relatively few criticisms that have been made of the school. To be sure, as Kenyatta clamped down on opposition voices, Griffin faced less opposition, at least in public. But Griffin's adept navigation 5 through various competing interests and agendas also enabled him to bring people round to his cause. Here he could be almost duplicitous. Belying his close connections to the Kenyatta elite, he presented himself to SCF, for instance, as a victim of the regime. He insisted that he wished to leave his 10 role as National Youth Leader to devote more time to SCF, but that Kenyatta, followed by Moi, would not allow him to do so. 121 This may have been a dream for Griffin, but he was nevertheless being disingenuous since he knew too well of the damage to his salary and other entitlements as a civil servant 15 that would be lost were he to switch employment to a foreign agent. 122 'Obliged' to carry on in only an honorary capacity, assisted by his able deputy, Pat Shaw, Griffin then worked to oppose other schemes that might deflect funding from Starehe. He blocked funding for a Home for Destitute Girls 20 in the Pumwami district of Nairobi that a SCF Council member visited and wished to support, and he persistently reined in SCF's activities even when headquarters made it clear that it wished to expand its work in the country. 123 Instead, he managed to place ever more of his Starehe staff 25 on the SCF payroll, making it liable for certain employer responsibities. 124 One area where he did face sustained criticism was in regard to gender. He argued, and he dug his heels in, over the development of a Starehe for girls in the 1970s, despite female education 30 becoming recognised at this time as a vital tool for development and notwithstanding repeated prompting from visiting NGO staff and figures as prominent as Moi. 125 Griffin did his duty and participated in the wide-ranging interministerial committee to look into a Starehe Girls' Centre that the president instigated in
1980.
126 But he will have been privately relieved when the proposals became overshadowed and then forgotten by the president amidst the unsettling of the regime in the run up to the attempted coup d'état in 1982. Griffin's excuse was always 5 that he simply did not have enough time and that the promotion of girls' education lay properly with women's welfare organizations. 127 In this regard it is telling that the Starehe Girls School did not open its doors until as late as 2005, the year of Griffin's death. 128 But for others too, Griffin's single-minded 10 focus on his boys was a problem. By the later 1970s, senior staff at SCF were becoming frustrated with Griffin's Starehe-centric approach to development yet he continued successfully to divert their attempts to give him a salary, an initiative which might reasonably have led to more being expected of him as their 15 administrator. 129 SCF also began to express 'disquiet' over 'Mr Shaw's place in certain types of police operation' but even then Griffin deflected their concerns and instead persuaded SCF to increase Shaw's salary. 130 Griffin has been described as a genius by many, but perhaps his ultimate achievement was his ability to 20 avoid sustained criticisms of any kind.
The final demonstration of this interplay between charity, decolonization and development came in the support of the Kenyan state for Griffin's fund-raising schemes. Starehe held the key to a world of international funding which the very 25 highest officials of the Kenyan government were keen to access. Kenyatta may have sniffed at 'those professional friends of the African' but he was not averse to accepting their money. 131 Whenever he and Moi spoke at Starehe events, they were always sure to acknowledge the financial support received from 30 the various agencies. 132 This was part of a more general policy on the part of the moderate nationalists to court the West. Mboya and Kariuki were both well known friends of the US and both used their visits to that country to attract donations to Starehe. Kariuki returned from one such trip as early as 1965 bearing a 5 personal cheque for £50 that he had obtained from Louis Stumberg, the Texan frozen foods entrepreneur. 133 Griffin knew full well the implications of these donations. As he expressed it to the Ministry of Education, 'it may be felt that, in view of the country's developing state and budgetary problems, 10 we should not lightly cast aside the present very substantial income from private sources (much of which results in useful foreign exchange) ' . 134 Yet what is even more remarkable is that the state did not passively accept such props to its own limited welfare policies. It also actively approached the international aid 15 community on behalf of Starehe. The Ministry of Education wrote directly to agencies such as NOVIB and Brot für die Welt to support Griffin's requests for assistance, explaining how important Starehe was to its nation-state building. 135 When the potential for charitable assistance took on greater proportions, 20 the state could mobilize its personnel in a manner similar to how it might approach the official institutions of global government. In 1972 Vice-President Mwai Kibaki, then also the minister for finance and the patron of Starehe, addressed the IUCW directly to support a substantial donation. As he 25 explained, because of the 'pressing problems on almost every front' that Kenya as a nation was facing, 'we must look for beneficiaries outside Kenya to assist with capital works'. 136 For all of these reasons -financial, political, pedagogical, personal, philosophical -the seemingly peculiar circumstances 30 of Shaw's appointment begin to make more sense. Griffin could present a focus on discipline, order and service that seemed to place in microcosm the political principles of the government and in a manner which could be sold to the West. It also meant that Shaw did not have to hide his activities with Special Branch from 35 the school. What he achieved on the streets of Nairobi with youths lost to the criminal world actually complemented the work of the school with those boys young enough to have been saved from such a career. Indeed, Shaw is said to have taken some of the boys out with him on reconnaisance trips, utilizing the skills that 5 Griffin had instilled in them through the scout troop. Even after Shaw had been rumoured -along with China -to have been involved in Kariuki's assassination, he was still revered by the boys. 137 In an interview conducted with him in the school magazine, Scan, he recounted his work as a police reservist 10 when he first arrived in Kenya. The boys, for their part, joked that they entered his office 'gingerly', grateful that they were able to 'escape' to publish their interview. 138 The boys obviously knew and possibly even approved of his activities, and he was supported in them by not only Griffin and -indirectly -the SCF, but also 15 by the Kenyan government. Amidst the confusing years of decolonization and independence, when all sorts of agencies and institutions were jockeying for roles and authority, charity also intervened to set down its own marker in a more general, if locally complex, mixed economy of welfare and development. 20 
III
It is important to draw out that which is particular to Starehe and that which has more general applicability. Certainly, the specificities of Starehe are many and the whole philosophy of the school appears as something of an anachronism. Griffin's 25 rhetoric located the school within Kenyatta's notion of harambee and even of African socialism more generally. Yet it borrowed almost all of its traditions from what he considered to be the hallmarks of the English public school to the extent that it largely copied Harrow's 'School Song'. Griffin discipline to the extent that he meted out punishments himself with a military efficiency. So familiar was the importance of order and discipline to both elite, public school-educated backers in Britain and a first generation of nation-builders in Kenya, that 5 it no longer appears quite so remarkable that his deputy was a sadistic voluntary police reservist who frequently operated outside the law. That Shaw's salary continued to be paid by SCF was, perhaps, a little more surprising, but merely attests to the compromises made and the blind eyes that had to be turned 10 when charities involved themselves in specific acts of assistance. But it is in the support that the school received that something of a more general nature emerges. Griffin clearly took advantage of his position as an official of a western charity, a civil servant in a colonial and then post-colonial government and as a volunteer 15 director of a school. He occupied a space in social welfare created by the interlinked processes of decolonization, development and the expansion of philanthropy across Africa. From there, he was able to ensure that his school received a steady supply of donations at the expense of other initiatives in Kenya. He was 20 able to present Starehe as fitting the needs of Kenya's new rulers, assisted through the regular visits that he arranged for the likes of China, Mboya, Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki. The school might well have been the product of a British regime, but it thrived once the bureaucracy of the imperial state had 25 withdrawn and it proved itself an attractive source of western funds to a nationalist government too unwilling or too unable to devote such resources to education or homeless youth itself.
This should not detract from the wider context within which Starehe thrived. Charitable interventions enabled non-state 30 actors to become key agents in developing social welfare models for African post-colonial development. The question comes down to whether the success of the school equates with the success of development more generally. There is no denying that Griffin was successful on his own terms, and it is obvious 35 too that the various aid agencies and governments also regarded Starehe as a success, not least because they continued to fund and support it over several decades. But from a development perspective, success is ultimately measured according to different criteria. Starehe was initially championed as an 40 instance of several NGOs' pursuit of grassroots initiatives which, by the 1970s, would be celebrated more widely as the 'alternative' path to development. This was to be focused on small-scale local initiatives which aimed to have as their principal beneficiaries the most needy in society, such as the boys taken in at Starehe. And, ultimately, success for these 5 projects would come when they became either self-sustaining or were replicated elsewhere with similar results. Yet Starehe's success in this regard has been dependent upon its continued charitable status. Those who have given to the school have had to keep on giving. Here Starehe becomes emblematic of 10 some of the more general problems associated with charitable interventions in development, especially at this moment of decolonization. The alternative approach of the NGOs was never systematically planned or coherently thought out. A story of success has been presented here, but it could so easily have 15 been one of failure, as in the case of Oxfam and Christian Aid's adventures with ujamaa in Tanzania, one of the few examples of the history of charity and development that has been comprehensively covered.
139
All these experiments in alternative development initiatives involved complications, 20 contradictions and complexities that have proved the chief stumbling blocks whenever an NGO has sought to scale up the benefits of a Starehe or any other scheme to a more general level. And particularly in the 1960s, when methods of project evaluation were, at best, rudimentary or else, more commonly, connected persons who offered an opportunity to do good in a fast and efficient manner. In doing so, they rushed headlong into a gap in the provision of social and economic welfare that so many individuals and institutions had an interest in them filling.
The fact that police officers, royalty, sports stars, celebrities and 35 politicians could all come together to support an initiative shows that they were all involved in a wider game of development about which the rules and the expected outcomes were only vaguely understood. That this all happened in the period from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, before the NGO approach to development really took off as a global phenomenon, points to the essentially messy and uncoordinated nature of decolonization and development. Yet it set in motion many of the dynamics 5 between the donating public, the sponsoring agency, the local beneficiary and the fledgling state that would come to be solidified in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Undoubtedly, what it did was to carve out a role for charitable agencies in the developing world that is now no longer 10 questioned, no matter how diverse and effective such interventions have proved to be. The end result of the NGO intervention in the fledgling Starehe enterprise in 1959, as with so many other development schemes, was that charity would come to be a persistent presence over the next half century and 15 more.
Queen Mary University of London

AQ1
Matthew Hilton
